A Time-Dependent Model of Products

Liability
Consumers who buy manufactured goods do so with the expectation that the goods will be both fit for a particular use and capable of being used for some reasonable amount of time. Take, for
example, a ladder. Most consumers expect to be able to use a new
ladder for normal purposes over a considerable span of years. Although ladders will become unfit for use at varying rates of speed,
as the years pass even the most durable ladder inevitably deteriorates. When a worn-out rung finally gives way, who should bear the
cost of the resulting injury-the manufacturer or the consumer?
This is only one example of the problem that product age
poses for a products liability tort system. In particular, it shows
that the increasing risk of accidents as products become more dangerous with use and age bears on the selection of a liability rule.
Although manufacturers may be held to very strict standards when
they offer products to the public, it is clear that they should not be
required to offer only products that have an infinite useful life.
The fact that products age, then, raises the question of how to allocate, as between the manufacturer and the consumer, the costs of
injuries caused by products that simply wear out due to the passage of time.1
This comment uses economic analysis to examine how the factor of product age bears upon the selection of a standard of manufacturer liability. It attempts to determine the optimal standard of
liability over time from the perspective of social cost minimization. 2 Along the way it explains how expressly incorporating prod-

In this comment, the term "manufacturer" identifies anyone who participates in the
distribution of a product to the public. This includes any wholesaler and retailer, along with
the manufacturer itself, since liability for defective products can be found against any link
in the chain of manufacture or distribution. See W. KEroN, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 703-07 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]. Also, the term "consumer" is not synonymous with "purchaser," but identifies any user of a product. For instance, an employee who is injured in a
product-related accident would be classified as a consumer even though the employer owns

the product.
I This comment approaches the problem of defining a standard of liability from an
economic perspective, thus with one value at the forefront-the minimization of the social

costs of accidents. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (describing the basic eco-
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uct age in the determination of the optimal standard of liability for
product-wear injuries improves upon the established economic
model of tort law.
Part I briefly examines how courts have dealt with the problem of product age. Part II sets out a time-dependent economic
model of tort law. This model is used to evaluate various liability
rules by measuring the incentives they provide for people to behave in ways that minimize the social cost of accidents. The model
suggests that when products reach a certain age the standard of
manufacturer liability should shift from a rule of strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence to a negligence rule. Part
III examines current judicial practice in light of the model. The
comment shows that the model's conclusions are largely reflected
in current products liability law. A concluding discussion defends
the model's conclusions against possible criticisms raised by the
problem of administrative costs, but notes that the conclusions
might differ if more accurate information were available concerning the administrative costs imposed by the various standards of
tort liability.
I. TImE

AND THE COURTS

For many decades courts refused to find manufacturers liable
for injuries that could be traced ultimately to product wear. This
approach fit well when the prevailing tort law standard was one of
negligence: under this standard, manufacturers were liable only if
the injured consumer could demonstrate that the product was negligently made and hence "imminently dangerous." 3 Because product wear cannot be entirely prevented even by due care in the
manufacturing process, the manufacturer was protected from liability as long as the product was reasonably durable. Thus, the
negligence rule placed the cost of wear-related accidents on the
consumer.
This approach was applied in the 1941 case, Auld v. Sears,

nomic model). While a consideration of the social costs of accidents is certainly important to
the selection of a liability rule, other values-compensation of victims, for example-are
also relevant. The analysis that follows does not take into account such non-economic val-

ues, and thus should be read in light of its perspective.
3 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916). Under the law as expressed in MacPherson, a manufacturer's liability to remote
users of a product was limited. The manufacturer must have had knowledge of probable
(not merely possible) danger and must have foreseen use of the product by people other
than the purchaser. Id. at 389-91, 111 N.E. at 1053-54.
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Roebuck & Co. 4 Auld was injured by a washing machine sold to

him by Sears. At trial Sears established that the accident occurred
because a pin which held the machine's wringer in place wore out
due to the passage of time. The court held that since "[c]ommon
sense and every day experience teaches us that machinery will
wear out," Sears had no duty to provide a washing machine that
would last forever. 5 Thus it could not be liable for an accident
caused by wear. Instead, any duty to repair or keep the machine in
good order rested solely upon the plaintiffs.'
The principle expressed in Auld was put in jeopardy by the
advent of strict products liability. Beginning in the 1960s, courts
began to discard the requirement that injured consumers prove
negligence in the manufacture of defective products. Instead, in
most jurisdictions products liability actions are now governed by a
standard like that expressed in section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
4 261 A.D. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941), aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1942).

5 Id. at 918-19, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see also Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 472-73
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Prettyman, J., dissenting) (weather and wear on staircase railing just
as likely to have caused it to collapse as negligent repair), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956);
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
6 261 A.D. at 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 493; cf. Nelson v. Swedish Hosp., 241 Minn. 551, 557,
64 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1954) (imposing the burden of repairing an X-ray machine on hospital
because the machine "was part of the hospital's permanent equipment. The duty rested
upon them to inspect and maintain it in a safe operating condition.").
7 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), an implied
warranty of safety was extended to product users other than the purchaser. The scope of the
warranty approach to liability was, however, limited by standard contract principles that
required the victim to give reasonable notice of his injury, see, e.g., UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49
(1906); U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1977), and allowed the manufacturer to expressly disclaim all
warranties, see, e.g., UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71 (1906); U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). Although courts
managed to avoid these restrictions by judicial sleight of hand, it was far easier for them to
abandon the warranty approach entirely and adopt a strict liability standard. See Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 112734 (1960).
Today most jurisdictions follow the "strict liability for defect" standard first announced
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963),
and later adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). That standard of
liability requires that in order to make out a cause of action against a manufacturer the
plaintiff must produce evidence that:
(1) claimant's injury or illness was attributable to a dangerous condition of a product
identified as being one that was supplied by the target defendant, either as a manufacturer or some other seller or supplier in the marketing chain; (2) the product was defectively dangerous at the time of the damaging event out of which the claimant's injury
or illness arose; (3) the defective condition was a cause of the damaging event; (4) the
defective condition was in existence at the time possession was surrendered by the defendant; and (5) the defective condition was a proximate or legal cause of the damaging
event.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 103, at 713.
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relationship with the seller. 8
Even though manufacturer liability for wear-related accidents
might serve the same policies of compensation and cost spreading
that justify strict liability, 9 courts continue to deny recovery for
injuries caused by product wear. For example, the Auld principle
was applied in a case decided three decades later, Kaczmarek v.
Mesta Machine Co. 10 Kaczmarek's decedent was killed at work by
a malfunctioning pickling machine. The court relieved the manufacturer of liability for a broken component part, a chain, because
the chain had been in use for two years before the accident. According to the court, the defendant had no duty "to furnish a chain
that would not wear out," or to "guard against any injury which
results from wear and deterioration of parts."" The court echoed
the reasoning of Auld: the decedent's employer, and not the manufacturer, was obligated to make "frequent, if not periodic inspections and replacements of the worn parts as soon as they are
2
detected."1
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Since liability turns on proof of defect, manufacturer liability is not absolute. But see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
9 Courts have accepted strict products liability for three reasons: it spreads the costs of
accidents by imposing strict liability on manufacturers, who can pass the costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices; it encourages accident prevention by forcing manufacturers to insure the risks imposed by their products; and it avoids burdening plaintiffs with
a need to prove manufacturer negligence, which is extremely difficult as a result of the institutional and economic limits of litigation. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 98, at
692-93 & nn.3-5.
10 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972).
11 Id. at 678.
12 Id.; accord Auld, 261 A.D. at 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 493; see also Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir.) ("The law is that a manufacturer does not have to anticipate that maintenance will be neglected."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976); McBride v.
Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 762, 673 P.2d 55, 64 (1983) ("A manufacturer is entitled to
assume that its product will be properly maintained."); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532
S.W.2d 197, 201 (Ky. 1976) ("[The manufacturer] is entitled. . . to rely on the owner of the
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The effective result of cases like Kaczmarek is to vary the
standard of manufacturer liability over the course of a product's
lifetime. When a new product is shown to be the cause of an accident, courts generally presume the existence of a defect; consequently, manufacturer liability is determined essentially by a rule
of strict liability.13 When an older product is shown to be the cause
of an accident, courts generally presume that the product simply
wore out unless the plaintiff can demonstrate manufacturer negligence; consequently, manufacturer liability is determined by a negligence standard. 1 4 The economic model of tort liability developed
in the next section demonstrates that this shift in the standards of
liability provides the proper economic incentives for product use.
II. A

TIME-DEPENDENT MODEL OF TORT LAW

The economic model of tort liability seeks to evaluate the
costs of accidents to society. 15 It recognizes as a first principle that
the parties involved in an accident-injurer and victim-seldom
have an opportunity before the accident to negotiate about how to
allocate the costs of the accident or its prevention. Legal rules at-

machine to assume responsibility for keeping it in safe working order.").
11 See infra note 42 (citing cases and authorities); Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 828-36 (1983) (discussing the "malfunction theory," whereby original defect is presumed if the injury occurs shortly after
purchase). The manufacturer can avoid liability by demonstrating that the accident resulted
from product wear or the consumer's failure to properly maintain the product.
,1 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir.) ("a manufacturer is
not under a duty to supply materials that will not wear out"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871
(1976); Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 232 Kan. 654, 684, 659 P.2d 799, 818 (1983) (Schroeder,
C.J., dissenting) ("The rule is that a manufacturer does not have an obligation to manufacture a product that will not wear out."); Barich v. Ottenstror, 170 Mont. 38, 44, 550 P.2d
395, 398 (1976) ("A manufacturer or seller is not required ... to produce or sell a product
that will never wear out."); see also Savage v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 396 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("to hold otherwise would be tantamount to suggesting that a manufacturer is an insurer of his products"); Foster v. Marshall, 341 So. 2d 1354, 1361 (La. Ct. App.)
(a manufacturer "cannot be expected to design products with component parts which will
never wear out"), cert. denied, 343 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1977); Jakubowksi v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 185, 199 A.2d 826, 831 (1964) ("[T]here is no duty on the part of a
manufacturer to furnish tools which will not wear out."); Courtois v. General Motors Corp.,
37 N.J. 525, 543, 182 A.2d 545, 554 (1962) (no duty on manufacturer since the "knowledge is
universal that manufactured articles which depend upon -moving parts ... will eventually
suffer fatigue and wear out"); Gomez v. E.W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 651, 211 N.Y.S.2d
246, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("Clearly, there is no duty on the part of the manufacturer to
furnish a machine that will not wear out.").
15 The basic model was first developed in Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973). It has since been the subject of further scholarly development. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L.
REV. 851 (1981); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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tempt to fill this gap by providing standards of behavior that inform the parties before the accident about how its costs will be
allocated afterwards. The normative economic theory of tort law
tries to prescribe legal rules that minimize the total social cost of
the accident. Social cost includes the costs of preventing the injury
and the expected costs of sustaining the injury along with the cost
of administering the legal rule itself. This section sets forth the
traditional economic model of accidents, then suggests how it
ought to be altered to account for product aging.
A.

Developing the Model

The traditional economic model defines the social cost of an
accident in the following terms:"6
C

=

A X =
W
Y

=

W,
P(X,Y)

=

P (X Y)

=

P (X,
Y)

=

KL

=

=

=

the total social cost of the potential accident.
the amount of damage if the accident
occurs.
the number of units of care taken by the
injurer.
the cost of one unit of care for the injurer.
the number of units of care taken by the
victim.
the cost of one unit of care for the victim.
the probability that an accident is avoided
given that the injurer and victim exercise a
certain level of care.
the change in the probability that an accident is avoided if the injurer increases his
care level by one unit.
the change in the probability that an accident is avoided if the victim increases his
care level by one unit.
the cost of administering the liability rule.

Using these terms, the total social cost of a potential accident can
be written as follows:
C = WX + WyY + (1-P(XY))A ± KL.
An accident's social cost thus has four components: the cost of
16

The conventions used in this comment are largely identical to those used in earlier

models of economic tort theory. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 324-27.
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avoidance to the injurer; the cost of avoidance to the victim; 17 the
total expected cost of the accident itself, given the subsequent conduct of both the injurer and the victim; and the cost of administering a liability rule that governs the distribution of these costs.18
From this equation, it follows that out of all the possible levels
of care that the injurer and victim could exercise, there is some
combination where the social cost of the accident (C) is minimized.
These levels of care, expressed as X* and Y*, represent the socially
optimal levels of care for the injurer and victim, respectively.
These optimal levels of care can also be expressed in terms of the
marginal benefits of each party's expenditures on care. At these
optimal levels, each party has increased its expenditures on care
until the cost of an additional unit of care equals the reduction in
expected accident costs. 19 In algebraic terms,
WX= Px(XY)A
and
WY =

(X,Y)A.

While this model works well in standard physical injury
cases-for instance, where an injurer accidentally strikes a victim-it omits one element that is necessary to explain injuries
"

The model developed in this comment restricts itself to consideration of those acci-

dents where only two parties are involved. Only injurer and victim behavior are assumed to
bear on the social costs of accidents.
18 Commentators using the economic model have assumed that administrative costs of
different liability rules are equal, and thus have omitted any term for administrative costs.
See Brown, supra note 15, at 325-26; Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 869. But see infra
note 49 and accompanying text. The initial discussion of the model presented here, which
does contain such a term (KL), will also assume that administrative costs of all liability rules
are equal. But it should be noted that the model's solutions are only definite as long as
administrative costs do not vary depending on the liability rule. If this assumption is incorrect, other solutions become possible. For a discussion of how the administrative costs problem may affect the analysis under the model, see infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
" This expression is often referred to as the "incremental Hand formula," after Judge
Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Carrol Towing Corp., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). Under the incremental Hand formula, a party is deemed to be negligent if the cost of
an additional unit of care is less than the reduction in expected accident costs. See Brown,
supra note 15, at 332-35.
10 In order for these results to make sense, two mathematical conditions must hold.
First, the functions P, and Py must both be positively defined over the relevant domains.
Second, the first derivative of the functions must be decreasing. In layman's terms this
means two things. First, the probability of avoiding an accident should increase as the
amount of care exercised by an injurer or victim increases. Second, each additional unit of
care exercised should produce a smaller increase in the likelihood of avoiding an accident
than that produced by each unit of care which has gone before. Further increases in care
therefore give a dimininishing return in protection. Intuitively, such a probability function
seems sensible.
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caused by products. In the standard physical injury case, the
probability that an accident can be avoided depends solely on the
level of care taken by the injurer and the victim. When the accident involves a durable good, however, the probability of an accident occurring also depends upon the passage of time. Thus the
minimization of the social cost of product-related accidents requires attention not only to the amount of care that should be exercised, but to the age of the product as well.
To make the model accurate for product-related accidents, it
must take account of the time element. Such a time-dependent
model can be written as follows:
C = WX + WY + (1-P(X,Y,T))A + KL
with T representing the age of the product. In this model, because
the social cost of an accident depends upon the age of the product,2 1 the optimal injurer and victim care levels (X* and Y*) also
become dependent on the product's age. The aggregate social cost
is thus minimized when
WX= PX(X,Y,T)A
and

W,,= PX, Y,T)A.
B.

Implications of the Model

The economic model predicts that two liability rules are optimal.22 The first is a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. Under such a rule, the victim has an incentive to
exercise Y* in care. Any lesser expenditure risks accidents for
21 The new equations explicitly depend only upon the age of the product (7). The increased probability of an accident depends, of course, upon the deterioration of the product,
which is a function both of its age and the intensity of its use. While the variable T only
reflects the first of these components, the latter factor is reflected in the change in the victim's optimal amount of care (Y*). The consumer must realize that the probability of an
accident occurring increases with every use of a product, thus requiring the consumer to
exercise incrementally greater care with each use.
22 Properly speaking, the model predicts that three rules of liability will lead to socially
optimal levels of care: strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, simple negligence with no defense, and negligence with a defense of contributory negligence. See Brown,
supra note 15, at 338-43. The first two rules are analytically symmetrical in that under the
former, the injurer bears the costs of the accident unless the victim is negligent; under the
latter, the victim bears the costs unless the injurer is negligent. Because the third rule yields
essentially the same results as does the second rule under the model, it is not considered
separately in the discussion. Also, it should be noted that comparative negligence is not an
efficient liability rule under the model.
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which the victim could not recover at all because of contributory
negligence. Given that the victim can be expected to exercise Y* in
care, the injurer will be liable for all injuries that occur. Thus, the
injurer has a strong incentive to exercise X* in care in order to
minimize the sum of the injurer's expected liability and costs of
23
taking care.
A simple negligence rule produces the same result. Here the
injurer has an incentive to exercise X* in care. Any lower level of
care risks accidents for which the injurer would be liable because it
was negligent. Given that the injurer can be expected to exercise
X* in care, the victim will bear the costs of all injuries that occur.
Thus, the victim has an incentive to exercise Y* in care, which will
minimize the sum of the victim's expected accident costs and his
costs of taking care.
However, a closer look at the concept of care shows that the
strict liability and negligence rules do not necessarily achieve identical results. The level of care taken by a party can be separated
into two distinct components. A party can exercise caution in performing an activity 24 -for instance, by looking both ways before
crossing a street. Or a party can adjust the frequency of engaging
in an activity-by crossing one street per day instead of a
hundred.2 5

23 In mathematical terms, the result flows from the private cost schedules faced by
both the injurer and the victim. Under a strict liability standard, the injurer's cost schedule
is:
C, = WX + (1-P(X,Y,T))A, for Y = Y*
and
C, = WX, for Y < Y*.
Assuming that the victim will be non-negligent, the injurer's private cost-minimization condition will be identical to the social cost-minimization condition:
W, = PI(X,Y*,T).
Consequently, the injurer will behave in the optimal fashion.
A consideration of the victim's private cost schedule shows why the injurer must assume that the victim will be non-negligent:
C, = WY + (1-P(X,Y,T))A, for Y < Y*
and
C, = WyY, for Y > Y*.
For Y < Y* the injurer's private costs decrease, regardless of the injurer's choice, since the
injurer has no incentive to exercise greater care than X*. For Y > Y* the victim's private
costs increase. Thus, the victim's minimum cost occurs at Y = Y*.
For a detailed mathematical proof of these propositions, see Brown, supra note 15, at
343.
" Much of the literature refers to this portion of the care input as the "care level"
component. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 15, at 2. Because this terminology confuses care
levels and care inputs, this comment substitutes the term "caution level."
11 In the products liability context, the concepts of "activity level" and "caution level"
need to be defined in slightly more detail. For the manufacturer the concept of activity level
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This distinction affects the predictions of the model in at least
two ways. First, adjustments to caution level and adjustments to
activity level will involve different costs. For example, getting into
the habit of looking both ways before crossing the street will be
less burdensome to a person than refraining entirely from crossing
streets. Second, different kinds of care will be more or less effective
in preventing an accident. Not crossing streets may reduce the
chance of an accident to zero; looking both ways will not. Thus, the
caution-activity distinction has implications for the costs of taking
care (W, and Wy) and for the change in probability of an accident
that results from those expenditures (PX(X,Y,T) and P,(X,Y,T)).
This, in turn, has two consequences for the choice of a liability
rule, one that is recognized by both the traditional model and the
time-dependent model, and another that is unique to the time-dependent model.
1. InstitutionalAbility of Courts. In order to properly apply
either optimal liability rule, courts must be able to measure the
activity levels and caution levels of the parties. If courts systematically err in applying the rule, parties will not have the incentives to
expend the optimal amounts (X* and Y*) on care." In practice,
however, the courts' institutional ability to measure and then determine the relative allocation of a party's expenditures on activity
and caution forms of care is limited. On the one hand, courts are
capable of gauging the parties' expenditures on levels of caution
because courts usually have all the evidence regarding a specific
accident before them. But the evaluation of activity levels is often
more difficult; it may require evidence about a party's conduct over
a long period of time, and that calls for a proceeding of enormous
complexity.2 7 The courts' institutional limitations thus inhibit
their ability to evaluate each party's activity level in order to determine whether that party was negligent. This means that a theo-

is straightforward; it is reflected in the number of products sold in a given period of

time-for example, one million ladders per year. The consumer's activity level also can easily be defined as the number of times the consumer uses the product in a fixed period of
time. "Caution level," on the other hand, comprises the entire range of elements discussed
in standard negligence cases. It encompasses the specific precautions employed by the manufacturer in production-observing industry standards, for instance-and the precautions
taken by the consumer in using the product-for example, following the manufacturer's instructions. See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 871, 875-76.
2' The earlier literature failed to recognize this complication, see, e.g., Brown, supra
note 15, but later publications identified it and demonstrated its consequences for selection
of a liability rule, see Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 871, 875-76; Shavell, supra note
15, passim.
27 See Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 875-76.
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retically optimal liability rule may not necessarily yield optimal results in practice. 8
It is this practical problem-the costly nature of inquiries
about activity levels-that provides a basis for preferring either a
rule of strict liability or a negligence rule in particular categories of
cases.2 9 As the model shows, both of these rules lead to a minimization of the social cost of product-related accidents in an ideal
world. In practice, however, because of the difficulty of the inquiry
into activity levels, the "optimal" rule would seem to be the one
which minimizes the need for this inquiry in particular cases. This
suggests that in those categories of cases where it is obvious that
one party's activity level is an important component of the optimal
care mix, it makes sense to presume that party to be liable. Thus
the challenge is to determine which party's activity level is more
important to control-from there the liability rule which leads to
the smaller social cost can be implemented.
Applying this insight shows that a rule of strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence should be favored when the activity level is an important component of the injurer's optimal input, but not of the victim's input. The paradigm activities for
which a rule of strict liability is appropriate are abnormally dangerous activities-blasting, for example.3 0 The simplest method of
reducing the damage to nearby structures that inevitably results
from blasting is for those who engage in that business to engage in
less of it. There is little or nothing a victim can do to protect himself from injury. By employing a strict liability rule the court will
avoid engaging in an expensive inquiry into the injurer's activity
level. Instead, the court need only focus upon the victim's caution
level. Because the injurer will bear the full cost of an accident as
long as the victim is not negligent, the injurer will have incentive
to behave in an optimal fashion, and will do so by altering his activity level, his caution level, or some combination of both.3 1
In contrast, in circumstances where activity level is a more important component of the victim's input than of the injurer's, the

See Shavell, supra note 15, at 2-4.
For an examination of the traditional tort law areas of strict liability in light of the
distinction between activity level and caution level, see Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at
904-16.
S See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § § 519, 520 (1977).
11 It should be emphasized that a true strict liability rule is not identical to the standard set out in section 402A of the Restatement. The latter requires proof of defect while
the former does not. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (discussing this difference
'.

and how it is applied by courts).
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activity level-caution level distinction demonstrates that a negligence rule should be applied. Under a negligence rule the court can
limit itself to inquiring whether the injurer acted negligently. If the
injurer was not negligent, the victim will bear the full cost of the
accident. The victim will have an incentive to reduce these expected losses as far as possible by appropriately adjusting both his
activity level and his caution level. Thus, returning to the case of a
purchaser of a ladder, the purchaser will increase his care input
under a negligence rule both by exercising greater caution-checking the ladder more throughly-and by reducing his
activity level-using the ladder less frequently.2
2. Distinguishing New and Worn Products. A liability rule
must also account for the changes in the optimal levels of activity
and caution forms of care that occur as the product ages; in this
regard the time-dependent model proposed by this comment differs from its static-model predecessor. The newer model recognizes
that the optimal care inputs of the injurer and the victim (X* and
Y*) vary as the product becomes older. As these optimal inputs
change over time, the mix of activity and caution levels which constitute those optimal inputs will also vary. This change in activity
and caution levels indicates that one liability rule may be appropriate when the product is new, and another when the product is
older. Thus, unlike the static model, the time-dependent model
recognizes that a shift in liability rules may be appropriate as time
passes.
A good way to apply this insight of the time-dependent model
is to look first at which liability rule is optimal for new products.
This inquiry focuses on whether it is more important to control the
manufacturer's activity level or the consumer's activity level during the time immediately following manufacture. For aging products, however, applying the model requires a two-step analysis of
the effects of the passage of time: (1) how the increased risk of
accident over time affects the optimal injurer and victim inputs
(X* and Y*); and (2) if the optimal inputs are altered, how that
change is likely to be apportioned between caution level and activ33
ity level.
32 Under the model, this point is strictly true for a simple negligence rule. If the negli-

gence rule allows a defense of contributory negligence, the analysis differs slightly though
the same result follows.
33 A possible third step in the inquiry would be to determine whether at a particular
point in time the relative changes in the parties' optimal activity and caution levels are
sufficient to require a shift in the liability rule. This inquiry is necessary to determine precisely when the shift should take place. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (dis-
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For new products, it is reasonable to assume that it is more
important to control the manufacturer's activity level than it is to
control the consumer's. The overwhelming majority of new products can be used repeatedly with relatively little risk of accident,
which indicates that a reduction in the victim's activity level would
be an inefficient way to reduce the probability of new product accidents. In contrast, no matter how much caution a manufacturer
exercises, some defects and accidents are inevitable. It is thus intuitive to attribute the majority of accidents that occur early in a
product's life to defective manufacture rather than lack of consumer care. These accidents can be avoided only by reducing the
manufacturer's activity level-the number of products manufactured and sold. And this can be accomplished only if strict liability
with a defense of contributory negligence is the legal rule. 4
The passage of time alters this analysis. Because the
probability of an accident occurring rises with a product's age, the
parties should use increasing amounts of care over the product's
life. In terms of the time-dependent model, this result can be expressed as follows:
(1 - P(X,YT 2 )) > (1 - P(X,YTI)), for T 2 > T,
which implies that
X *(T) > X *(T,)
and
Y*(T2) > Y*(T,). 35
In addition to causing a change in the optimal care inputs of
both the manufacturer and the consumer, the aging of a product
cussing the timing of the shift).
34 A negligence rule might be optimal if the class of injured consumers could be restricted to product purchasers. In such a case, the real price of the good to the purchaser
would be the manufacturer's price plus an amount equal to the purchaser's expected accident costs. Knowing this, consumers would base their purchase decisions on prices that reflect the full cost of the product, thus leading to a reduction in the number of products sold.
But, because in real life third parties are also accident victims, and the expected costs of
third-party accidents are not reflected in the price the purchaser pays to use the product, a
negligence rule leads purchasers to base purchase decisions upon a price that is too low.
" This result-that an increase in the probability of an accident occurring means an
increase in optimal care-input levels-makes mathematical as well as intuitive sense. Where
the probability of avoiding an accident is lower, the incremental gains (in reduced expected
accident costs) from an additional unit of care are greater:
PJ(X,Y,T) > PX(X,Y,T)
Graphically, this means the decreasing function P.A shifts to the right as time passes and
intersects the line W, = k (where k is a constant) at a greater value of X. The same, of
course, applies to additional care exercised by the victim (Y).
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also affects the allocation of care between activity and caution
levels. How the parties will choose between activity and caution
forms of care over time depends fundamentally on the relative
benefits of each kind of care. For older products, the manufacturer
is able to adjust its total care input only by altering its caution
level; the manufacturer's activity level-the number of products
3 6
produced in past years-is unalterable.
In contrast, consumers are able to alter caution and activity
levels in response to the increased risk from older products. A consumer can both exercise greater caution when using an older product, and use it less frequently. Since the consumer's optimal care
input also increases as products age, that increased input may be
expressed as an increase in the caution level, a decrease in the activity level, or some combination of the two.
This difference between the relative costs of care to manufacturers and consumers suggests that a two-tier standard of liability
would best approximate the efficient legal rule. For new products,
a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence
gives manufacturers an incentive to adjust their activity to the socially optimal levels. It also gives both manufacturers and consumers an incentive to optimize their caution levels. As the product
ages and deteriorates, however, the liability rule must ensure that
manufacturers and consumers exercise greater amounts of care and
must also provide incentives for consumers to alter their activity
levels. Because consumers can most easily reduce their activity
levels as the product becomes older and more dangerous, they
should bear the cost of most accidents from worn products. Manufacturers should be liable for such accidents only when they have
been negligent and the consumer exercised due care in using the
product.
Of course, no single liability rule will minimize social cost for
all product accidents. And the effectiveness of a split-liability rule
will depend ultimately on some estimate of the proper time for the
38 Because manufacturers cannot easily keep contact with their products after sale,
changes in their caution level may be limited to disseminating information about known
defects or about proper care and maintenance. For unpredictable and non-uniform defects,
however, even these measures would not help to prevent accidents.
The recall of a product might be considered a change in the activity level of a manufacturer, rather than a change in its caution level, since recall takes a product out of the consumer's hands altogether. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, many recalls are not permanent; the product is repaired and returned to the consumer. Second, recalls are not
completely efficacious; the consumer must decide whether to return the product. Since the
ultimate control of the product rests with the consumer, a recall is more strictly analogous
to a warning-albeit a much louder and more forceful one.
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switch from strict liability to negligence.37 The strict liability period might be a fixed period of time, such as five or ten years, 8 or
it might be defined by a product-specific "useful sale life"
39
limitation.

III.

THE MODEL AND REALITY

The conclusions derived from the time-dependent model are
to a large degree already reflected in current products liability law.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has been applied so as to embody the model's recommendation that the legal
standard shift from a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence to a rule of negligence as the product ages.
Furthermore, the argument for such a split-liability rule is not undermined by the model's assumptions regarding administrative
costs, although the exact nature of the optimal shift will depend
upon an accurate assessment of the "real" costs of enforcing different liability rules. However, given the uncertainty over administrative costs which now exists, the current tort regime can be defended as approaching an efficient system of products liability.
A.

Section 402A and the Model

By its terms, section 402A does not enact a split-liability rule,
but courts have applied it so as to achieve the same effect. There
are two principal differences between the literal terms of section
402A and the approach suggested by the time-dependent model.
First, section 402A enacts something less than pure strict liability
for product-related accidents.40 Pure strict liability would hold a
manufacturer liable upon proof that its product caused injury; section 402A requires proof of both causation and defect. 41 This addi" Clearly, the relative importance of the care inputs of the manufacturer and consumer cannot be expressed as a discrete function. Rather, the function that maps the optimal mix of these care inputs over time will be continuous. A shift in liability rules, however,
must be discontinuous. There is no practical way to construct a continuously shifting liability rule that tracks the continuously shifting function. Hence, the split-liability standard
suggested here is not optimal; yet it remains a significant improvement over either of the
uniform standard liability rules that do not take into account the shift in the relative importance of the care inputs over the lifetime of the product.
" Indeed, one study shows that approximately 96% of all product injuries occur within
six years of purchase. The Devils in the ProductsLiabilities Laws, Bus. WK, Feb. 12, 1979,
at 75.
'" See infra note 57.
40 See supra text accompanying note 8.
41 For a discussion of the meaning of defect in section 402A of the Restatement, see
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
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tional burden on plaintiffs may exonerate manufacturers in some
situations where the model's approach would not. Second, unlike
the model's approach, section 402A does not explicitly apply a negligence rule to wear-related accidents.
In practice, however, these differences tend to be minor. Despite the express language of section 402A, courts typically do not
require proof of defect in accidents caused by new products; in
most cases, a defect in the original product is presumed and only
causation must be shown.42 And for older products, the courts do
not consider product wear to be a "defect" within the meaning of
section 402A. 43 Injured parties may recover for injuries caused by
product wear only if they show that the manufacturer was negligent. In effect, then, the Restatement approach closely resembles a
split-liability rule: new product accidents are governed by an almost pure strict liability rule; old product accidents are governed
by a negligence rule.
B.

The Problem of Administrative Costs

The fundamental insight of the economic model of tort law is
its identification of the need for a shift in the liability rule over
time. Such a shift would help to minimize the social cost of accidents by giving consumers incentives to limit their use of and be
more careful with older, more dangerous products. There are two
ways to provide the necessary incentives: a shift to a negligence
rule or a shift to a rule of no liability. In a world without administrative costs, the model predicts that the optimal shift would be to
a negligence rule.
But the model's failure to account for the administrative costs
of enforcing the various possible standards of tort liability is perhaps its most dissatisfying feature. The model assumes that the
administrative costs of all liability rules are equal.44 Yet it is obvious that different liability rules do generate different administraREV. 363 (1965).
42 See, e.g., Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 614, 624-26, 271 N.W.2d 777,
782-83 (1978); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 330-33, 188 N.W.2d
426, 432-34 (1971); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 409-412, 161 A.2d
69, 97-99 (1960); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 99, at 696-97; Schwartz, supra
note 13, at 828-36 (discussing the "malfunction theory" whereby original defect is presumed
if the injury occurs shortly after purchase); cf. Kimbrell v. Zenith Radio Corp., 555 P.2d 590
(Okla. 1976) (the fact that a television purchased in 1965 caught fire in 1973 was not enough
to establish original defect).
s See cases cited supra note 14.
4' See supra note 18.
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tive costs. Thus, two questions must be addressed. Does the possibility of higher administrative costs under a split-liability rule
undermine the model's rejection of a uniform strict liability rule?
Does the probability of lower administrative costs under a regime
containing a shift from strict liability to a no-liability rule undermine the model's support for a shift from strict liability to
negligence?
1. Administrative Costs Under the Split-Liability Rule. A
negligence rule might be thought more costly to enforce than a rule
of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. 4' The
latter rule eliminates the potentially complex inquiry into whether
the manufacturer was negligent and replaces this inquiry with a
cleaner and simpler presumption of liability. Although the defense
of contributory negligence may require litigation of a similarly
complex issue, the inquiry into possible negligence by the plaintiff
(the consumer) will usually be less protracted than the inquiry into
possible negligence by the defendant (the manufacturer). If so,
then a split-liability rule could be somewhat more costly to administer than a uniform strict liability rule with a defense of contributory negligence.
The problem with this criticism of the split-liability rule is
that it rests almost entirely on unproven assertions. Although it is
firmly established that the strict liability rule in products actions
has "substantially eased the plaintiff's burden of proof,"4 6 this indicates only that consumers are more likely to win cases, not that
the cases are any cheaper to litigate. Both sides still must present
evidence on a number of potentially tricky issues in the plaintiff's
case and must litigate any defenses asserted by the manufacturer.4 7
Even if a strict liability rule does narrow the issues in products
liability cases, the high stakes often involved in personal-injury
cases may lead the parties to concentrate just as many resources in
their struggles over the issues that remain.48

'5 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11, at 142, § 21.5, at 441-42 (2d
ed. 1977).
Is PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 103, at 714.
"' See supra note 7 (listing the elements of plaintiff's claim); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 102 (discussing manufacturer defenses).
Is For example, in a products-liability action under a negligence rule a party who could
afford expert witnesses might choose to introduce one expert on the issue of negligence and
another on causation. Even assuming that a rule of strict liability would obviate the need for
proof on the negligence issue, if the stakes were high enough the same party might choose
instead to introduce two witnesses on causation. In wrongful death actions, regardless of the
cause of action, the stakes can be quite high. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lueck,
111 Ariz. 560, 572-73, 535 P.2d 599, 611-12 (1975) (upholding a jury verdict of $2,000,000 in

The University of Chicago Law Review

[53:209

Moreover, one could see the concept of administrative costs as
comprising two elements: information costs, which are generated
by enforcing the liability rule in a single case, and claims costs,
which are generated by the number of cases brought under the liability rule.4 9 While the above discussion has called into question
the common assumption that a negligence rule imposes higher information costs than a strict liability rule, it seems clear that a
negligence rule leads to lower claims costs. Because "the elimination of the necessity of proving negligence has greatly improved a
claimant's chances for recovery in a particular case, ' ' 5 0 a strict liability rule encourages a greater number of products actions, with
correspondingly greater administrative costs. This combination of
an uncertain effect on information costs and a clear decrease in
claims costs under a negligence rule suggests that the claim of
higher administrative costs under a negligence rule is not only
speculative, but may well be incorrect.
Furthermore, even if a negligence rule-hence a split-liability
rule-imposes greater administrative costs than a strict liability
rule, it would be extremely difficult to formulate even a rough assessment of the difference in costs under the two rules. Thus, in
the absence of accurate information it is unclear how much significance should be attached to the problem of administrative costs in
this context. Given the model's insights into the socially optimal
allocation of care over time between the manufacturer and the consumer of a product, it seems unwise to dismiss its support for a
split-liability rule without more persuasive evidence about the
costs of enforcing alternative rules.
2. Time Limits on Manufacturer Liability. A second potential criticism of the time-dependent model also stems from the
model's failure to take administrative costs into account. Recognizing the need for a shift in the liability rule over time, this criticism
argues that rather than adopting a shift from strict liability to negligence, it would be more efficient to shift to a rule of no liability.
It is certainly true that any liability rule-whether strict liability

compensatory damages and $1,080,000 in punitive damages for death of a high school graduate whose income had never exceeded $6,000 per year).
'9 This terminology is adapted from Landes & Posner, supra note 15, at 874-75, where
essentially the same point is presented and explained in a slightly different manner. Although Landes and Posner discuss administrative costs in this passage, they did not incorporate these costs into their economic model. See id. at 869. See generally R. POSNER,supra
note 45, § 21.5, at 441-42 (the outcome of the balance between these two elements is
uncertain).
50 PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 1, § 99, at 696.
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or negligence-becomes more costly and difficult to enforce over
time. 5 1 The passage of time magnifies uncertainty and evidentiary
problems. At some point in time the difficulties become large
enough to justify a bright-line rule: after a certain period, manufacturers should never be subject to liability. This suggests that
the shift in manufacturer liability over time might be achieved
more simply through statutes of repose superimposed on a single
substantive rule governing products liability. 2
This recommendation makes intuitive sense; administrative
costs must be lower under a shift to a no-liability rule than under a
split-liability rule. On the other hand, the cost of miscalculating
the timing of the shift in liability rules is greater under a shift to a
no-liability rule than under a split-liability rule. If liability is cut
off too soon, consumers will be encouraged to retire products too
early, and manufacturers will not adjust their caution and activity
inputs to socially optimal levels. Thus, the choice between statutes
of repose and the split-liability rule is also subject to uncertainties
about the proper significance of administrative costs.
This uncertainty is evidenced by the fact that in dealing with
the possibility of a time limitation on liability for wear-related accidents, legislatures and courts have widely disagreed about the
scope of the administrative cost problem. Indeed, decisionmakers
have adopted two diametrically opposed positions. On the one
hand, it is plausible to assume that the costs of enforcement will,
at some point, be sufficiently large to justify an absolute cutoff in
the liability of the manufacturer. Some state legislatures have enacted limiting statutes that implicitly take this position. These
statutes of repose make some period of prolonged use, generally
five to twelve years, 3 conclusive against a finding of defect.54 Also,
5' This problem shows up in the traditional justifications for statutes of limitations.
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 219, 188 N.E.2d 142, 146, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1963) ("perhaps the possibilities of feigned cases against unprepared
defendants and the difficulties of proof in meritorious cases led to a decision that society is
best served by complete repose, even at the sacrifice of a few unfortunate cases").
2 See Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
" See Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a Statute of Repose, 32
BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 144 n.67 (1980).
"' The considerations behind this legislative action differ somewhat from those which
underlie the judicial rule that prolonged safe use conclusively demonstrates non-negligence.
The judicial rule, see Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957); cf.
Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946), is based on concern for
accuracy in an individual case and on the idea that prolonged safe use disproves the negligence of the manufacturer. Statutes of repose are based more clearly on ex ante considerations of certainty and minimization of administrative costs. Thus, under a statute of repose
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they usually provide that an action must be brought within a maximum limitation period which runs from the date of manufacture or
sale. 55 Once that period has elapsed, an action is completely barred
regardless of whether it is based on strict liability or negligence
unless an express warranty provides otherwise." A manufacturer
can insulate itself from liability by establishing that the product
57
has survived prolonged use.

the action is barred if brought after the statutory time limit, even if the accident happened
within the statutory limit or if other related actions were brought in a timely manner. The
judicial rule relies on the passage of time to prove that the product was not defective; the
statutes bar recovery even if it was. Nonetheless, the two rules have virtually the same effect; they absolutely limit manufacturer liability for older products.
Of course, noneconomic considerations will also affect legislative decisions to adopt or
reject statutes of repose. For example,'legislatures might seek to protect local manufacturers
from liability in order to attract new production to the state. On the other hand, the use of a
statute of repose as a protectionist measure may be politically unacceptable to the populace
because it denies state citizens access to the judicial process.
Il See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (1979) (ten years from date manufacturer last
parted with possession or control of product); N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1979) (six
years from the date of sale). For a comprehensive listing of state statutes of repose, see
McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionalityof Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U.L. REv. 579, 580 n.3 (1981); Comment, supra note 53, at 144 n.67.
16 In the absence of a statute of repose, courts may apply a negligence statute of limitations to product liability actions. See, e.g., Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d
395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). Under such a statute of limitations, the period
does not begin to run until either the injury occurs or, in some instances, is discovered. As a
result, manufacturers remain open to potential liability no matter how much time has
passed since the manufacture and sale of a product.
57 Some statutes fix a uniform time period for all products. For instance, the Uniform
Product Liability Act sets a date of ten years:
(1) Generally. In claims that involve harm caused more than ten (10) years after
time of delivery, a presumption arises that the harm was caused after the useful safe
life had expired. This presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
(2) Limitations on Statute of Repose. (a) If a product seller expressly warrants
that its product can be utilized safely for a period longer than ten (10) years, the period
of repose, after which the presumption created in subsection (B)(1) arises, shall be
extended according to that warranty or promise.
UNIF. PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 110(B) (1977), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1977).
Others employ what is called a useful safe life limitation which varies from product to product, an example of which is also provided in the uniform act:
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (A)(2), a product seller shall not be subject to
liability to a claimant for harm under this Act if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm was caused after the product's "useful safe life"
had expired.
"Useful safe life" begins at the time of delivery of the product and extends for the
time during which the product would normally be likely to perform or be stored in a
safe manner . ...
(2) A product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused by a product used
beyond its useful safe life to the extent that the product seller expressly warranted the
product for a longer period.
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On the other hand, the exact opposite assumption is also plausible, and many courts appear to have adopted it: although the difficulties and costs of enforcement increase with time, over the relevant life of most products they are insignificant compared to the
costs of retiring the product prematurely. This view has led courts
to conclude that the safe use of a product for a specified period of
time can never constitute conclusive proof that the product was
not defective. 58 They have determined, in effect, that no period of
accident-free use can absolutely bar recovery from the manufacturer. Instead, they consider the passage of time to be just one factor in determining liability.5" In this view, the administrative costs
of litigation are never too great to preclude a suit.
One further point deserves note. In many states where statutes
of repose have been adopted to govern products liability actions,
the courts have struck them down as repugnant to their state constitutions.6 0 Although the grounds of these decisions range far be61
yond the considerations that are the focus of the economic model,
UNIF. PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 110(A) (1977), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1977).
58 See, e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Systems, 609 F.2d 1069, 1074 (3d Cir. 1979) (under sec-

tion 402A of the Restatement, prolonged safe use of a product does not conclusively prove
the absence of defect). This point was often made under a negligence rule as well. See, e.g.,
Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1958) ("The proposition that
prolonged safe use bars any inference of negligent manufacture has not gained wide acceptance in the application of the MacPherson doctrine."), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959);
International Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.) (prolonged safe use
of "seven years does not, per se, relieve a. . . manufacturer from liability for injuries caused
by a defective [product]"), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957). But see, e.g., Schindley v.
Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946) (manufacturer who made 12,000pound gate used in power plant not liable when gate fell upon plaintiff after gate had been
used safely for three years); Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957)
(manufacturer of truck not liable when truck had functioned safely for five years and between 200,000 and 400,000 miles).
59 See Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318, 320, 473 P.2d 862, 862-63
(1970) ("The state of the present law is with near unanimity, that prolonged use of a manufactured article is but one factor. . .in the determination of whether a defect in the product made it unsafe for its intended use."); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa.
321, 336, 319 A.2d 914, 923 (1974) (" 'prolonged use of a manufactured article is but one
factor, albeit an important one, in the determination of the factual issue . . . whether [a
defect] caused the harm' ") (quoting Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959)).
"0See McGovern, supra note 55, at 581. In 1981, at the time of the McGovern survey,
29 states had considered the issue and nine had found the statutes of repose unconstitutional. Id. Since that time, more state courts have invalidated such statutes. See, e.g., Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 17,694 (Utah Dec. 31, 1985), summarized in 54 U.S.L.W. 2373
(1986).
"' Several state courts have determined that statutes of repose violate their constitutions because they deprive a plaintiff of his cause of action before the wrong to him may
reasonably be discovered. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggarty, 416 So. 2d 996
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the decisions themselves bear strongly on the conclusions that can
be drawn from the model. In particular, the presence of such constitutional problems narrows the impact of the administrative
costs problem. Because the model shows the desirability of some
shift in the standard of manufacturer liability over time, the adoption of the split-liability rule may be the only constitutional way to
minimize the social cost of accidents caused by defective products.
These wide disagreements underscore the importance to the
model of developing more precise assessments of the administrative costs imposed by tort law rules. Nevertheless, the time-dependent model offers two important lessons. First, it demonstrates the
need for a shift over time in the standard of liability applied to
manufacturers for accidents involving their products, in order to
provide consumers with incentives to retire older, more dangerous
products. Second, it suggests that the socially optimal allocation of
care between manufacturers and consumers supports a shift over
time from a strict liability rule to a negligence rule. Thus, in the
absence of more accurate information on the administrative costs
imposed by various liability rules, the time-dependent model offers
support for the current practice of applying a de facto split-liability rule to accidents caused by product wear.
CONCLUSION

In order to select an appropriate standard of manufacturer liability, it is necessary to isolate the factors that distinguish productrelated accidents from accidents generally. One central distinction
concerns the effects of the passage of time: product-related accidents become more likely as products age. Because of this fact, the
mix of conduct by manufacturers and consumers that minimizes
the social cost of accidents caused by new products will not minimize the social cost of accidents involving old products. Recognizing that the standard of liability must shift with the passage of
time, this comment has argued that a split-liability rule-strict liability for newer products and negligence-based liability for older
(Ala. 1982) (due process guarantees access to court for all wrongs); Battilla v. Allis Chalmer
Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (constitution explicitly guarantees access to courts);
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (limitation of action not
substantially related to legitimate legislative objective); Daugane v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984) (statute of repose repugnant to constitutional guarantee of open courts). But see, e.g., Chestwood Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lamberton Constr. Co.,
489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1985) (holding statute of repose constitutional); Fujoka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973) (same); Dauge v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind.
1981) (same). See generally McGovern, supra note 55, at 600-20 (discussing the cases).
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ones-will best control manufacturer and consumer conduct. More
than other liability rules, this split-liability rule controls the number of goods produced by ensuring that product prices substantially reflect the costs of accidents, and provides incentives for consumers to retire goods when their useful life is completed.
Peter V. Letsou

